DU MPhil Phd in Sociology

Sr.No	Question Id	Question Description	Question Body	Options
1	24104	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q01	In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different cities do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, *Cities Under Siege* , Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic *Splintering Urbanism* —provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban planning and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1996), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' of Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the world-wide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls "the new military urbanism." . . .The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including a multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then delves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad and domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* , in Berkeley Planning Journal, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] The author of the above passage is:	36414:Stephen Graham ,

				36415:Illaria Giglioli , 36416:Both Stephen Graham and Illaria Giglioli , 36417:Neither Stephen Graham nor Illaria Giglioli ,

2	24105	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q02	In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different cities do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, *Cities Under Siege* , Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic *Splintering Urbanism* —provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban planning and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1996), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' of Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the world-wide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls "the new military urbanism." . . .The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including a multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then delves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad and domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* , in Berkeley Planning Journal, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Based on the above passage, what does the book under review focus on?	36418:Questions of urban warfare in the Global South and their impact in Northern cities. ,

					36419:Techniques of the new urban militarism that reflect resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies. ,

					36420:Both Questions of urban warfare in the Global South and their impact in Northern cities. and Techniques of the new urban militarism that reflect resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies. ,

				36421:Neither Questions of urban warfare in the Global South and their impact in Northern cities. nor Techniques of the new urban militarism that reflect resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies. ,

3	24106	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q03	In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different cities do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, *Cities Under Siege* , Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic *Splintering Urbanism* —provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban planning and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1996), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' of Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the world-wide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls "the new military urbanism." . . .The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including a multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then delves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad and domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* , in Berkeley Planning Journal, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Based on the above passage, which of the following statements is incorrect.	36422:The book *Splintering Urbanism* is mentioned. ,

				36423:Occupy movements in Tahrir and Tiananmen square are mentioned. , 36424:The conflation of urban minorities with external enemies is mentioned. , 36425:U.S. car culture is mentioned. ,

4	24107	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q04	In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different cities do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, *Cities Under Siege* , Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic *Splintering Urbanism* —provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban planning and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1996), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' of Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the world-wide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls "the new military urbanism." . . .The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including a multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then delves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad and domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* , in Berkeley Planning Journal, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Based on the above passage, what is a characteristic of "new military urbanisms"?	36426:Multiplication of international borders. ,

				36427:Global climate change and impact on cities. , 36428:Proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings. , 36429:Collaboration between police and the public. ,

5	24108	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q05	In the fall of 2011, global media were characterized by strikingly similar images of the repression of urban citizen movements throughout the world. Similar military tactics were used to dislodge protesters from Tahrir Square in Egypt and Occupy encampments in the U.S., among other examples, raising the question of whether security forces in these different cities do indeed collaborate, and to what extent. In his latest work, *Cities Under Siege* , Stephen Graham—co-author of the classic *Splintering Urbanism* —provides a probing insight into this interrogative. The multi-thematic, 400-page-plus book revolves around one main argument: experiments in urban warfare in cities of the global south have led to the increasing militarization of North American and European cities, in a classic example of Foucault's 'boomerang effect.' Drawing on historical examples of the transfer of models of urban planning and surveillance from the space of the colony to that of the metropole (see Ross 1996), Graham understands a similar transfer of techniques to be occurring in the present. By juxtaposing the proliferation of security within cities of the Global North, the 'urbicide' of Palestinian and Iraqi cities, the militaristic undertones of U.S. car culture, and the world-wide proliferation of U.S. military bases, he aims to show "...how resurgent imperialism and colonial geographies characteristic of the contemporary era umbilically connect cities within metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries." (p. xxvii). The result of this process he calls "the new military urbanism." . . .The first three chapters touch on the broad themes of the militarization of cities of the global south and parts of cities of the global north, and the ideological binaries (Manichean geographies) that legitimize this militarization. Graham discusses the multiple ways in which the 'new military urbanism' is manifested, including a multiplication and militarization of borders, an increased collaboration between police and military, a creep in function between neoliberal and security infrastructure, and a tendency to conflate internal urban minorities with external enemies. On this basis, the book then delves into a series of thematic chapters dealing with the proliferation of borders and surveillance within urban settings, ranging from the increased technologization and depersonalization of war, to 'urbicide' and targeting of urban infrastructure in military operations. Graham discusses the role of the U.S., from the simultaneous proliferation of urban military bases abroad and domestic urban training centers to the spread of large militaristic SUVs in U.S. cities. The book closes with a focus on urban counter-geographies. [Source: Illaria Giglioli, book review of Stephen Graham's *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* , in Berkeley Planning Journal, 2012, 25 (1): 235 -239.] Who does the author attribute the "boomerang effect" to?	36430:Foucault , 36431:Stephen Graham ,

				36432:U.S. military policy , 36433:Occupy movements in the US ,

6	24110	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q06	Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches can be discerned. The first, best exemplified by *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and primitive societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall in his famous monograph *Alur Society* not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary society" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is best exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); and, from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with only one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dahomey – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the tribe and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a: ll), the most important among these mechanisms are "the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances." The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all types of primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either without any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations which are devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on some of these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The works summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves, and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and finally, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to other aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in *American Anthropologist,* 1959, 61(2):200-220.] What are the different types of political systems found in Africa?	36438:Segmentary , 36439:Centralized ,

				36440:Segmentary and centralized , 36441:None of the above ,

7	24111	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q07	Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches can be discerned. The first, best exemplified by *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and primitive societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall in his famous monograph *Alur Society* not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary society" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is best exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); and, from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with only one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dahomey – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the tribe and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a: ll), the most important among these mechanisms are "the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances." The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all types of primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either without any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations which are devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on some of these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The works summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves, and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and finally, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to other aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in *American Anthropologist* , 1959, 61(2):200-220.] Who acknowledges Durkheim's work on segmentary political system?	36442:Evans-Pritchard , 36443:Southhall , 36444:Fortes ,

				36445:Gluckman ,
8	24112	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q08	Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches can be discerned. The first, best exemplified by *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and primitive societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall in his famous monograph *Alur Society* not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary society" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is best exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); and, from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with only one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dahomey – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the tribe and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a: ll), the most important among these mechanisms are "the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances." The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all types of primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either without any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations which are devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on some of these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The works summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves, and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and finally, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to other aspects of the social organization. [Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A	36446:they have tendencies to segment ,

			Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in *American Anthropologist* , 1959, 61(2):200-220.] Comparative studies on African political systems show that:	36447:they have tendencies to form alliances , 36448:they have tendencies to both segment and form alliances , 36449:None of the above ,

9	24113	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q09	Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches can be discerned. The first, best exemplified by *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and primitive societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall in his famous monograph *Alur Society* not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary society" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is best exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); and, from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with only one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dahomey – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the tribe and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a: ll), the most important among these mechanisms are "the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances." The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all types of primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either without any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations which are devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on some of these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The works summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves, and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and finally, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to other aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A	36450:The criterion of comparison is not spelt out ,

			Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in *American Anthropologist* , 1959, 61(2):200-220.] In what respects are comparative studies on African political systems inadequate?	36451:Very little information on groups performing government functions , 36452:They fail to relate political function with other social organizations , 36453:All of the above ,

10	24114	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q10	Despite the abundance of material, there have been few systematic works on comparative political systems of primitive societies. In the available literature, two main approaches can be discerned. The first, best exemplified by *African Political Systems* (Fortes and Evans Pritchard 1940), is to differentiate between the "stateless," so-called segmentary societies and primitive societies with centralized governmental and political organizations. Aidan W. Southall in his famous monograph *Alur Society* not only quoted Durkheim's definition of "segmentary society" but also developed his own conception of "segmentary structure" and "segmentary system". The second approach to the study of comparative primitive political institutions is best exemplified in the works of Colson (1954), Gluckman (1954a) and Peristiany (1954); and, from a somewhat different point of view, Hoebel (1954). While most of these works deal with only one tribe or society, they provide, either explicitly or by implication, possible comparative applications. Their main concern has been to show that in all primitive societies – ranging from small bands of hunters or fishermen to kingdoms such as those of Zulu, Swazi, and Dahomey – there exists some basic mechanism of social control which regulates the affairs of the tribe and resolves conflicts arising among its component groups. In the words of Gluckman (1954a: ll), the most important among these mechanisms are "the inherent tendencies of groups to segment and then to become bound together by cross-cutting alliances." The general assumption is that most of these mechanisms are in one way or another common to all types of primitive societies-whether "segmentary," centralized or some other. This approach poses the problem of the conditions under which various regulatory mechanisms operate, either without any specialized roles and organizations, or through specialized roles and organizations which are devoted mainly to the performance of regulatory tasks. Also implicit in some of these studies is the question of which area of life (economic, ritual, and so forth) makes such regulation most important and necessary. Hoebel's work on primitive law touches on some of these problems, mainly from the standpoint of the development of legal institutions. The works summarized above have laid the foundations for the comparative study of primitive political institutions, but they are inadequate in several ways. First, there has been little comparative work using the criteria of comparison offered; second, some of these criteria have not been sufficiently systematic, as shown by Smith (1956); third, there has been too great an emphasis on the groups which perform governmental functions rather than on the functions themselves, and an inadequate differentiation between various types of governmental functions; and finally, there have been few attempts to relate the organization of various political functions to other aspects of the social organization.[Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Primitive Political Systems: A	36454:It differentiates between small bands of hunters and large kingdoms ,

			Preliminary Comparative Analysis", in *American Anthropologist* , 1959, 61(2):200-220.] In the second approach to the study of comparative political systems, the problem is that...,	36455:We do not know whether the regulatory mechanisms in these systems operate with or without specialized roles and organizations ,	

				36456:It makes the economy seem more important than rituals , 36457:It makes no difference between ‘segmentary societies’, ‘segmentarystructures’, and ‘segmentary systems’. ,

11	24116	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q11	These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is redeemed through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife/ daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was gained with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in their turn if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land he purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because a daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the position of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control of houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; women use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriliny in West Sumatra, *Ethnos* 64(1): 32-56.] A married daughter may stay in her mother’s house:	36462:To raise her family , 36463:Only when she is divorced ,

				36464:Only for a short time when she gives birth to children , 36465:None of the above ,

12	24117	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q12	These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is redeemed through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife/ daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was gained with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in their turn if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land he purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because a daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the position of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control of houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; women use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriliny in West Sumatra, *Ethnos* 64(1): 32-56.] The creation of nuclear households among the Minangkabau:	36466:Is a result of state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households ,

				36467:Has not resulted in matrilineal ideology being undermined , 36468:Subverts women's control of houses and land , 36469:None of the above ,

13	24118	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q13	These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is redeemed through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife/ daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was gained with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in their turn if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land he purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because a daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the position of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control of houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; women use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriliny in West Sumatra, *Ethnos* 64(1): 32-56.] New houses that men may help build:	36470:Follow the patrilineal principle , 36471:May become matrihouses ,

				36472:Are bilateral , 36473:Are all owned by the husband ,

14	24119	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q14	These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is redeemed through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife/ daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was gained with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in their turn if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land he purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because a daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the position of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control of houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; women use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriliny in West Sumatra, *Ethnos* 64(1): 32-56.] Women claiming rights to both jointly built houses and land gained with their husband's help indicates:	36474:The way patrilineality is instantiated , 36475:That men are marginalised ,

				36476:That men are heads of households , 36477:The way matrilineality is reinstantiated ,

15	24120	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q15	These nuclear households remain firmly invested in matrilineal ideology. Although state efforts to prop up men as breadwinners and heads of households are well known to rural Minangkabau, husbands do not assert claims to their wives' land nor to land that is redeemed through joint effort. Nor do they articulate a right to the new houses that they help build with their earned income. People in the village maintain that a new house belongs to the wife/ daughter, whether or not a husband/father's income helped to build it. In addition, a wife has a right to her husband's income but the husband does not have the same right in his wife's income. In sum, women claim rights both to jointly built houses and to land that was gained with husband's help. Some of these new houses may even become matrihouses in their turn if a married daughter stays at home to raise her family. These claims to houses and land reinstantiate matrilineality by incorporating new small houses and new resources into the matrilineage. Although in a few individual cases a husband provides the majority of household income, the control he thereby gains operates within a matrilineal ideology that empowers women to appropriate land and resources to their matriline. Even if a father passes on land he purchased to a daughter, this inheritance practice does not instantiate patrilineality because a daughter keeps such land for her matriline. State efforts to establish husbands in the position of household heads conveniently ignore local relations without subverting women's control of houses and land. Matrilineal ideology provides the foundation for household relations; women use this ideology to configure new houses to their advantage. [Source: Evelyn Blackwood, 1999. Big Houses and Small Houses: Doing Matriliny in West Sumatra, *Ethnos* 64(1): 32-56.] In the light of the above passage, which one of the following statements is true?	36478:When the husband provides majority of income, patrilineality is instantiated. ,

				36479:When a father passes on his property to his daughter, patrilineality is instantiated. ,
				36480:Matrilineal ideology allows women to configure new houses to their advantage. ,

				36481:Husbands claim rights to land or houses they have jointly acquired with their wives in Minangkabau. ,

16	24122	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q16	The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom, all of which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us very far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes of life under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to "the state" or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. …Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the creative and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of social system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. *Everything Was Forever*, *Until It Was No More,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press] According to the above passage, which of the following features of the Soviet system are relatively unknown:	36486:The suffering it caused ,

				36487:The ethical and humane values of lived socialism , 36488:The fact that its collapse was being expected by its citizens , 36489:The repression that underlay the system ,

17	24123	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q17	The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom, all of which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us very far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes of life under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to "the state" or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. …Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the creative and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of social system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* ,New Jersey: Princeton University Press] The human values that underlay 'really existing socialism' were:	36490:Equality, community, altruism ,

				36491:Fear, repression and competitiveness , 36492:Boredom with work, fatigue and fatalism , 36493:Desire, sex and fantasy ,

18	24124	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q18	The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom, all of which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us very far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes of life under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to "the state" or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. …Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the creative and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of social system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No Mor* e,New Jersey: Princeton University Press] According to the passage, post-Soviet nostalgia is a longing for:	36494:The economic prosperity promised by capitalism ,

				36495:The friendships and creative possibilities of socialism , 36496:The comforting official ideologies of the socialist state , 36497:The return to religion promised by the end of socialism ,

19	24125	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q19	The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom, all of which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us very far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes of life under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to "the state" or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. …Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the creative and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of social system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* ,New Jersey: Princeton University Press] Humanist and ethical values had the following relationship with state ideology	36498:They were produced by state ideology ,

					36499:They existed despite state ideology , 36500:They had a complicated (and not binary) relationship with state ideology ,

				36501:They were a product of longing for the ideologies of the capitalist state ,

20	24126	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q20	The Soviet system produced tremendous suffering, repression, fear, and lack of freedom, all of which are well documented. But focusing only on that side of the system will not take us very far if we want to answer the question posed by this book about the internal paradoxes of life under socialism. What tends to get lost in the binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact that, for great numbers of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental values, ideals, and realities of socialist life (such as equality, community, selflessness, altruism, friendship, ethical relations, safety, education, work, creativity, and concern for the future) were of genuine importance, despite the fact that many of their everyday practices routinely transgressed, reinterpreted, or refused certain norms and rules represented in the official ideology of the socialist state. For many, "socialism" as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of "normal life" (normal'naia zhizn') was not necessarily equivalent to "the state" or "ideology"; indeed, living socialism to them often meant something quite different from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric. An undeniable constitutive part of today's phenomenon of "post-Soviet nostalgia," which is a complex post-Soviet construct, is the longing for the very real humane values, ethics, friendships, and creative possibilities that the reality of socialism afforded—often in spite of the state's proclaimed goals—and that were as irreducibly part of the everyday life of socialism as were the feelings of dullness and alienation. …Without understanding the ethical and aesthetic paradoxes that "really existing socialism" acquired in the lives of many of its citizens, and without understanding the creative and positive meanings with which they endowed their socialist lives—sometimes in line with the announced goals of the state, sometimes in spite of them, and sometimes relating to them in ways that did not fit either-or dichotomies—we would fail to understand what kind of social system socialism was and why its sudden transformation was so unimaginable and yet unsurprising to the people living within it. [Source: Alexei Yurchak, 2005. *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* ,New Jersey: Princeton University Press] According to the above passage, which of the following were found in 'really existing socialism'? I. Humane values and repression II. A society free of contradictions III. Ethical and aesthetic paradoxesIV. Feelings of dullness and alienation	36502:I, II and III , 36503:I and III , 36504:I, III and IV ,

				36505:All of the above ,
21	25883	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q21_New	Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased. As such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist analysis of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meaning. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely into the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich variety of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of specific cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of media begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive power is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, these material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corpse as dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus both a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Margaret Schwartz,2013."An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," *communication +1* : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?	43527:Dead bodies are objects that convey the meaning of life to those who are living. ,

				43528:Dead bodies craft a relation between the presence and absence of person. ,
				43529:Dead bodies are objects that lose their symbolic power due to their materiality. ,

				43530:Dead bodies craft a relationship between horror and cultural symbols. ,

22	25884	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q22_New	Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased. As such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist analysis of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meaning. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely into the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich variety of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of specific cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of media begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive power is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, these material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corpse as dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus both a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Margaret Schwartz,2013."An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," *communication +1* : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?	43531:Corpses are texts that can be universally understood across cultures. ,

				43532:The corpse cannot be understood by anyone because death is a mystery. ,
				43533:The corpse stands between local and universal understandings of death ,

				43534:The corpse can be understood only by culturally astute people of society. ,

23	25885	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q23_New	Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased. As such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist analysis of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meaning. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely into the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich variety of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of specific cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of media begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive power is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, these material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corpse as dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus both a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Margaret Schwartz,2013."An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," *communication +1* : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?	43535:The meaning of dying disappears when the corpse decomposes. ,

				43536:The smell of decomposition makes a corpse an avoidable object. ,
				43537:Decomposed corpses are terrifying objects of thought. ,

				43538:Decomposition reduces the cultural value of the dead. ,

24	25886	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q24_New	Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased. As such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist analysis of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meaning. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely into the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich variety of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of specific cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of media begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive power is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, these material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corpse as dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus both a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Margaret Schwartz,2013."An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," *communication +1* : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?	43539:The materiality of the corpse makes it the subject matter of natural sciences. ,

				43540:The materiality of corpses does not place them outside the purview of the natural sciences ,
				43541:The materiality of the corpse places it outside the purview of social sciences. ,

				43542:The materiality of corpses does not place them outside the purview of social sciences. ,

25	25887	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q25_New	Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a deceased. As such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a "materialist analysis of media." The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most intense cultural meaning. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse is thus to inquire precisely into the relationship between the material and the textual, between the thing itself and the rich variety of representational texts required to make sense of it, to venture between the world of specific cultural and historical practice, and the universality of death. A materialist analysis of media begins with the corpse because the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation. For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and whose discursive power is inseparable from its materiality. The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, these material properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corpse as dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus both a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. [Source: Margaret Schwartz,2013."An Iconography of the Flesh: How Corpses Mean As Matter," *communication +1* : Vol. 2(1).] Which of the following statements can be inferred from the above passage?	43543:Decomposed dead bodies are materially significant but culturally irrelevant. ,

					43544:Culturally freighted, decomposed dead bodies lose their material significance. ,
					43545:Smell, texture and material appearance of corpses makes them culturally significant ,

				43546:Decomposed corpses are infectious and threaten the living. ,

26	24140	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q26	Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation's past, which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is, in its very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things and omits others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This spiritual principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the past has to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." …in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only abstract ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours more clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" could cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, all societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. … Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must itself come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013.*Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice* .Boston:Harvard University Press.] The spiritual principle of the nation involves:	36558:A narration of past suffering , 36559:A willingness to live together ,

				36560:A future of common goals , 36561:All of the above ,

27	24141	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q27	Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation's past, which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is, in its very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things and omits others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This spiritual principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the past has to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." …in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only abstract ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours more clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" could cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, all societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. … Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must itself come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013.*Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice.* Boston:Harvard University Press.] Defining a given nation requires:	36562:an unordered or independent account of the past ,

				36563:a selective, future-oriented account of the past , 36564:a material rather than spiritual account of the past , 36565:people sufficiently dedicated to accounts of the past ,

28	24142	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q28	Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation's past, which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is, in its very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things and omits others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This spiritual principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the past has to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." …in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only abstract ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours more clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" could cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, all societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. … Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must itself come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013.*Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice* .Boston:Harvard University Press.] The passage suggests that love for the nation is likely to be:	36566:more if the nation demands more sacrifices ,

					36567:less if the nation has endured less suffering ,
					36568:Both more if the nation demands more sacrifices, and less if the nation has endured less suffering ,

				36569:Neither more if the nation demands more sacrifices, nor less if the nation has endured less suffering ,

29	24143	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q29	Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation's past, which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is, in its very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things and omits others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This spiritual principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the past has to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." …in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only abstract ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours more clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" could cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, all societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. … Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must itself come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013.*Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice* .Boston:Harvard University Press.] National projects of altruistic sacrifices are threatened by:	36570:Anti-national ideologies that produce disgust ,

				36571:Hierarchical separations within the nation , 36572:The need for emotions of loving concern , 36573:Clearly demarcated contours of morality ,

30	24144	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q30	Patriotic emotion seeks devotion and allegiance through a colourful story of the nation's past, which points, typically, to a future that still lies in doubt. Indeed, the idea of a nation is, in its very nature, a narrative construct. To say what a given nation is is to select from all the unordered material of the past and present a story line that emphasizes some things and omits others, all in the service of pointing to what the future may hold— if people dedicate themselves sufficiently. French philosopher Ernst Renan influentially and convincingly argued that a nation is not simply a physical location; it is an idea, a "spiritual principle." This spiritual principle involves, on the one hand, a story of the past, usually a story of adversity and suffering, and then a commitment to the future, a willingness to live together and face adversities for the sake of common goals. The two sides are linked, because the story of the past has to tell people what is worth fighting for in the future. Renan remarks that the past has to have in it something great or glorious, but it also needs to have loss and suffering: "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort." …in Renan's words, "One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered." Following Batson, we may add that a good story of a nation's past will involve not only abstract ideals, but also particular individuals; not only a conceptual space, but also physical places. The need for emotions of loving concern becomes even more apparent, and their contours more clearly demarcated, when we consider the threat posed to morality by disgust. Disgust jeopardizes national projects involving altruistic sacrifice for a common good, for it divides the nation into hierarchically ordered groups that must not meet. What "common good" could cross those lines? Given that separations motivated by disgust are so common in real societies, all societies need to find ways to surmount this problem. … Given that the other has already been vividly depicted in one way, as subhuman, the antidote to that way of imagining must itself come via the imagination, in the form of experiences of seeing the other as fully human. [Source: Martha Nussbaum, 2013.*Political Emotions - Why Love Matters for Justice* .Boston:Harvard University Press.] The passage suggests that social separations motivated by disgust are common and have to be surmounted by:	36574:Refusing to vividly depict the other , 36575:Rejecting subhuman antidotes ,

				36576:Imaginative experiences that fully humanise the other , 36577:All of the above ,

31	24146	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q31	"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would vanish along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. … the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would ask, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" asked Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. Now the body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So the body needs to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the ashes, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas [Buddhist priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died.' Now the body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much solace as knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly or too suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, its lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether he or she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme's words … brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. *Sensory Biographies.* Los Angeles: University of California Press.] What is the most important reason why the gods decided to leave the body of a person behind after the soul had left it?	36582:So that people would not worry about missing relatives ,

					36583:So that the bereaved could view the corpse ,
					36584:So that people could understand the true meaning of death ,

				36585:So that the bereaved could perform the death rituals with the body ,

32	24147	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q32	"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would vanish along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. … the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would ask, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" asked Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. Now the body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So the body needs to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the ashes, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas [Buddhist priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died.' Now the body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much solace as knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly or too suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, its lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether he or she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme's words … brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. *Sensory Biographies* .Los Angeles: University of California Press.] The sentence: "Here vision was as much solace as knowledge" means that:	36586:The visible dead body brought both comfort and knowledge ,

				36587:The visible dead body was a reminder that only solace can bring knowledge , 36588:The visible dead body was a reminder that only knowledge brings solace , 36589:None of the above. ,

33	24148	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q33	"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would vanish along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. … the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would ask, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" asked Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. Now the body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So the body needs to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the ashes, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas [Buddhist priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died.' Now the body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much solace as knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly or too suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, its lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether he or she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme's words … brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. *Sensory Biographies* .Los Angeles: University of California Press.] What was the common theme in most of Mheme Lama's interactions with the author?	36590:The absence and presence of body and soul , 36591:the experience of death by the living ,

				36592:The materiality and immateriality of human concerns , 36593:The act of seeing as an orientation of the senses ,

34	24149	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q34	"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would vanish along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. … the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would ask, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" asked Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. Now the body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So the body needs to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the ashes, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas [Buddhist priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died.' Now the body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much solace as knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly or too suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, its lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether he or she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme's words … brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. *Sensory Biographies* .Los Angeles: University of California Press.] The passage suggests that knowing and seeing are related because:	36594:Knowing enables seeing , 36595:Seeing enables knowing ,

				36596:Both are done by the same person , 36597:Both are associated with death ,

35	24150	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q35	"Many years before," Mheme Lama related, "when people would die, the body would vanish along with the soul, and people would cry and get very upset. … the body would vanish like 'phet'! Then the family of the dead man would cry and search for his body ... they would ask, 'Where is he?! Where has he gone?!' " "Before, the body would disappear as well?" asked Nogapu Sherpa. "Yes," Mheme said. "But then the deities said, 'This is no good,' and they decided that the people must be able to see the body. Now they make the body stay. Now the body remains, and the soul departs. When it leaves the body, the body decays. So the body needs to be cremated or buried. Ah, now they need to cremate the body, compose the ashes, perform the funeral rites. The body can't be kept here forever, so they call the lamas [Buddhist priests, to perform those rites]. And the family feels better, thinking, 'Yes, he has died.' Now the body remains, the body is cremated, the funeral rites are performed, and people can understand that the person is dead. 'It's death' [they say]." Here vision was as much solace as knowledge. Mheme understood that it was important that a corpse not vanish too quickly or too suddenly. A corpse is an absent presence, the vestige of a person no longer alive. Still, its lingering visual presence provides evidence of the transition from life to death, and so helps people to understand the actuality of any death. If they could not view the corpse, family members would search in despair, bewildered by the person's absence, unsure whether he or she was still alive. Since a lifeless body inevitably decays, it cannot be kept forever. Yet rather than having it vanish "like 'phet,' " as it once did, the gods arranged it so that a corpse would remain as a visible, palpable reminder of a person's death, giving bereaved family members sufficient time and the tangible, ritual means to come to terms with the death. Mheme's words … brought to mind ideas of materiality and immateriality, appearances and disappearances, contact and disconnection, longing and fulfillment, remembrance and forgetting, matter and the decay of matter, the changes that time effects, the fate of sentient bodies, the life and death of things. In most of these conversations vision was the dominant sensory orientation. [Source: Robert Desjarlais, 2003. *Sensory Biographies* .Los Angeles: University of California Press.] Death rituals are important because:	36598:They mark the transition from presence to absence. ,

				36599:They provide socially acceptable ways of dealing with physical decay. ,
				36600:They help the bereaved community to cope with the loss of one of their members. ,

				36601:All of the above. ,
36	24152	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q36	Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighbourhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still do, their zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, when they became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterritorializing force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Early urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as *land-succession* , after the ecological process in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem grows towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's centre. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition, with manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finallv the suburbs or the commuters' zone.Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago) and did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric-ring model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. *A New Philosophy of Society* . Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity.London and NY: Continuum.] According to the above passage, which of the following have territorializing effects? (i) State policies and law, (ii) Market factors, (iii) Community identities, (iv) Ecological factors	36606:Only (i) ,

				36607:Only (ii) and (iii) , 36608:All except (iv) , 36609:All ,

37	24153	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q37	Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighbourhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still do, their zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, when they became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterritorializing force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Early urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as *land-succession,* after the ecological process in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem grows towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's centre. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition, with manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finallv the suburbs or the commuters' zone.Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago) and did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric-ring model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* .London and NY: Continuum.] In the concentric ring model of the city:	36610:The city center is the most significant location where the upper-classes live. ,

				36611:The rich commute longer distances to work than the poor , 36612:Workers need to commute longer distances than middle class people , 36613:All of the above ,

38	24154	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q38	Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighbourhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still do, their zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, when they became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterritorializing force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Early urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as *land-succession,* after the ecological process in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem grows towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's centre. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition, with manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finallv the suburbs or the commuters' zone.Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago) and did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric-ring model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* .London and NY: Continuum.] We can infer from the above passage that:	36614:All cities in America have a concentric structure but this does not hold in Europe. ,

				36615:American cities like Chicago always had a concentric structure unlike European cities , 36616:A comparison between American and European cities is futile , 36617:None of the above ,

39	24162	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q39	Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighbourhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still do, their zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, when they became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterritorializing force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Early urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as *land-succession* , after the ecological process in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem grows towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's centre. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition, with manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finallv the suburbs or the commuters' zone.Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago) and did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric-ring model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity.* London and NY: Continuum.] According to the passage, land-succession occurs because	36646:Land use changes lag behind changes in the urban economy ,

					36647:Urban landed property is transferred from one generation to another ,
					36648:It is driven by increased geographical and social mobility of city dwellers ,

				36649:Speculative ownership of land delinks it from any specific uses ,

40	24163	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q40	Increased geographical mobility, in turn, interacted with the way in which land-assignment and land-use were determined to produce more drastic changes in the identity of neighbourhoods. Central authorities have always had a say in these allocative decisions, and they still do, their zoning regulations having a territorializing effect. Land-rents, on the other hand, when they became sufficiently fluid to give rise to economic speculation, were a powerful deterritorializing force, divorcing the reasons for land-ownership from any consideration of the activities taking place in it and promoting the relatively rapid displacement of one land-use by another. Early urban sociologists referred to this phenomenon as *land-succession,* after the ecological process in which a given assemblage of plants gives way to another assemblage as an ecosystem grows towards its climax mix of vegetation. Instead of plants these sociologists were concerned with land-uses and modelled this succession as a concentric expansion away from a city's centre. The core was taken over by a central business district, encircled by a zone in transition, with manufacture and deteriorating residential neighbourhoods. Next came a ring of working-class neighbourhoods, followed by middle-and upper-class neighbourhoods, and finallv the suburbs or the commuters' zone.Those early studies, however focused on a single city (Chicago) and did not give a full explanation of the mechanisms involved in succession. The concentric-ring model seems to be valid for many cities in the USA where incomes do tend to rise with distance from a city's centre, but not for many parts of Continental Europe, where the reverse is the case. [Source: Manuel Delanda, 2006. *A New Philosophy of Society. Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* .London and NY: Continuum.] The passage suggests that the concentric ring model of the city:	36650:Was useful to explain urbanisation in earlier times but not today ,

					36651:Is useful to understand American cities, but not European cities ,
					36652:Describes some urban patterns well, but does not explain them ,

				36653:Is not sufficiently critical of modern patterns of urbanisation ,

41	24156	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q41	The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronically to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a social-welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make the inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language … but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories like "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. . . . We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning when one speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose"publicity" contains an element of public recognition…. None of these usages, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings—in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity work" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as that sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas,1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] When did the words "public" and "public sphere" fuse into a "clouded amalgam" according to Habermas?	36622:In the historical period when they first began to be used ,

					36623:In the era of bourgeois society, advanced industry and welfare states ,
					36624:When they received a multiplicity of concurrent meanings ,

				36625:When they were synchronically applied to pre-capitalist society ,

42	24157	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q42	The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronically to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a social-welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make the inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language … but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories like "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. . . . We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning when one speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose"publicity" contains an element of public recognition…. None of these usages, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings—in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity work" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as that sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas,1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* . Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] Why does the word "public" continue to be used even though it has so many confusing meanings?	36626:Because neither science nor ordinary language have precise substitutes ,

					36627:Because it has a precise meaning in law, political science and sociology. ,
					36628:Because a precise meaning is not needed in ordinary language ,

				36629:Both because it has a precise meaning in law, political science and sociology,and because a precise meaning is not needed in ordinary language ,

43	24158	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q43	The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronically to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a social-welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make the inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language … but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories like "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. . . . We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning when one speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose"publicity" contains an element of public recognition…. None of these usages, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings—in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity work" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as that sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas,1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* . Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] How has the meaning of 'publicity' changed in the context of mass media?	36630:It used to refer to a sort of public recognition, now it only refers to things available to all ,

				36631:It used to perform a critical function but now it only performs a popular function ,

				36632:It used to refer to the result or effect of public opinion, it now refers to methods of shaping public opinion , 36633:All of the above ,

44	24159	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q44	The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronically to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a social-welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make the inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language … but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories like "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. . . . We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning when one speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose"publicity" contains an element of public recognition…. None of these usages, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings—in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity work" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as that sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas,1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] Which of the following senses of 'public' are included in the passage?	36634:public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities ,

				36635:a specific domain which is opposed to the private , 36636:something that is open to all , 36637:all of the above ,

45	24160	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q45	The usage of the words "public" and "public sphere" betrays a multiplicity of concurrent meanings. Their origins go back to various historical phases and, when applied synchronically to the conditions of a bourgeois society that is industrially advanced and constituted as a social-welfare state, they fuse into a clouded amalgam. Yet the very conditions that make the inherited language seem inappropriate appear to require these words, however confused their employment. Not just ordinary language … but also the sciences—particularly jurisprudence, political science, and sociology—do not seem capable of replacing traditional categories like "public" and "private," "public sphere," and "public opinion," with more precise terms. . . . We call events and occasions "public" when they are open to all, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs—as when we speak of public place or public houses. But as in the expression "public building", the term need not refer to general accessibility; the building does not even have to be open to public traffic. "Public buildings" simply house state institutions and as such are "public". The state is the "public authority." It owes this attribute to its task of promoting the public or common welfare of its rightful members. The word has yet another meaning when one speaks of a "public (official) reception"; on such occasions a powerful display of representation is staged whose"publicity" contains an element of public recognition…. None of these usages, however, have much affinity with the meaning most commonly associated with the category—expressions like "public opinion", an "outraged " or "informed public," "publicity", "publish", and "publicize". The subject of this publicity is the public as carrier of public opinion; its function as a critical judge is precisely what makes the public character of proceedings—in court, for instance—meaningful. In the realm of the mass media, of course, publicity has changed its meaning. Originally a function of public opinion, it has become an attribute of whatever attracts public opinion: public relations and efforts recently baptized "publicity work" are aimed at producing such publicity. The public sphere itself appears as a specific domain—the public domain versus the private. Sometimes the public appears simply as that sector of public opinion that happens to be opposed to the authorities. [Source: Jürgen Habermas,1991. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Translated by Thomas Burger. Boston: MIT Press.] In India, which of the following terms involves a meaning of 'public' that is contrary to the meanings suggested in the passage?	36638:Informed public , 36639:Public authority ,

				36640:Public school , 36641:Public function ,
46	24178	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q46	Comparedto2005,the*percentageincrease* inaccidentaldeathsin2015isthehighestfor: **Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015** All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths Causes | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | *Total Deaths 2005—2015* | *Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015* Air-Crash | 6 | 23 | 23 | *188* | *17* Drowning | 23571 | 28001 | 29822 | *304356* | *27669* Electrocution | 6987 | 9059 | 9986 | *95852* | *8714* Factory/Machine accidents | 671 | 1043 | 695 | *9866* | *897* Natural Calamity | 22415 | 25066 | 10510 | *240504* | *21864* Traffic Accidents | 118265 | 161736 | 177423 | *1695898* | *154173* Total Accidental Deaths | 294175 | 384649 | 413457 | *3791074* | *379107* Source: Adapted from *National Health Profile 2018*, Table 3.2.3, p.137.	36710:Air-Crash , 36711:Drowning , 36712:Electrocution , 36713:Traffic Accidents ,

<table>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>24179</td>
<td>DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q47</td>
<td>ConsiderthefollowingstatementsbasedontheaboveTable: I.Thenumberofaccidentaldeathsin2005islessthantheannualaverageofdeathsfrom2005—2015forallcauses. II.Thenumberofaccidentaldeathsin2015isgreaterthanthatin2005forallcauses. Whichofthesestatementsis/areTRUE?

Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015
All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths
<table><tr><th>Causes</th><th>2005</th><th>2010</th><th>2015</th><th>Total Deaths 2005—2015</th><th>Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015</th></tr><tr><td>Air-Crash</td><td>6</td><td>23</td><td>23</td><td>188</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Drowning</td><td>23571</td><td>28001</td><td>29822</td><td>304356</td><td>27669</td></tr><tr><td>Electrocution</td><td>6987</td><td>9059</td><td>9986</td><td>95852</td><td>8714</td></tr><tr><td>Factory/Machine accidents</td><td>671</td><td>1043</td><td>695</td><td>9866</td><td>897</td></tr><tr><td>Natural Calamity</td><td>22415</td><td>25066</td><td>10510</td><td>240504</td><td>21864</td></tr><tr><td>Traffic Accidents</td><td>118265</td><td>161736</td><td>177423</td><td>1695898</td><td>154173</td></tr><tr><td>Total Accidental Deaths</td><td>294175</td><td>384649</td><td>413457</td><td>3791074</td><td>379107</td></tr></table>Source: Adapted from National Health Profile 2018, Table 3.2.3, p.137.</td>
<td>36714:Both ,

36715:Neither ,

36716:Only I ,

36717:Only II ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>24180</td>
<td>DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q48</td>
<td>Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015
All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths
<table><tr><th>Causes</th><th>2005</th><th>2010</th><th>2015</th><th>Total Deaths 2005—2015</th><th>Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015</th></tr><tr><td>Air-Crash</td><td>6</td><td>23</td><td>23</td><td>188</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Drowning</td><td>23571</td><td>28001</td><td>29822</td><td>304356</td><td>27669</td></tr></table></td>
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Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	*95852*	*8714*
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	*9866*	*897*
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Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	*3791074*	*379107*

Source: Adapted from *National Health Profile 2018*, Table 3.2.3, p.137.

49	24181	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q49	Thesecondlargestproportional(orpercentage)increaseinthenumberofdeathsfrom2005to2010isfor:	36722:Traffic Accidents , 36723:Natural Calamity , 36724:Electrocution , 36725:Factory/Machine Accidents ,

Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015
All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths

Causes	2005	2010	2015	*Total Deaths 2005—2015*	*Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015*
Air-Crash	6	23	23	*188*	*17*
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	*304356*	*27669*
Electrocution	6987	9059	9986	*95852*	*8714*
Factory/Machine accidents	671	1043	695	*9866*	*897*
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Total Accidental Deaths	294175	384649	413457	*3791074*	*379107*

Source: Adapted from *National Health Profile 2018*, Table 3.2.3, p.137.

50	24182	DU_J19_MPHIL_SOCIO_Q50	ThelastrowofTableBshowsthetotalnumberofaccidentaldeathsfromallcauses,eventhoughonlyafewofthecausesofdeathareshownintherowsabove. ConsiderthefollowingstatementsbasedonTableB:I.Duringtheperiod2005to2015,TrafficAccidentsaccountedformoredeathsthanallothercausescombined.II.Statisticallyspeaking,airtravelisfarsafterthantravelbyroad.III.Between2005and2015,onaverage,Drowningkilledmorethanthirtytimesthenumberofpeoplewhodiedduetofactory/MachineAccidentseachyear.Whichofthesestatementsis/aretrue 	36726:All , 36727:None , 36728:II and III ,

Table X: Some Causes of Accidental Deaths 2005—2015
All-India data for Select Years, Total Deaths and Annual Average Deaths

Causes	2005	2010	2015	*Total Deaths 2005—2015*	*Ann. Avg. Deaths 2005—2015*
Air-Crash	6	23	23	*188*	*17*
Drowning	23571	28001	29822	*304356*	*27669*
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			Source: Adapted from *National Health Profile 2018*, Table 3.2.3, p.137.		36729:Only II ,